Arguments & Analysis at the Motion for Summary Judgement
...citing a series of suspicious circumstances surrounding the loss of the ring... |
On the motion for summary judgement, counsel for the insurer argued that it was unnecessary for the insurer to plead fraud, citing a series of suspicious circumstances surrounding the loss of the ring, including the fact that Mr. Demetriou never told his wife about the ring in the first place.4 Counsel for the insurer further observed that Mr. Demetriou had in the year prior lost another valuable piece of jewelry and had recovered from another insurer. Furthermore, counsel for the insurer alleged that Mr. Demetriou had failed to fully cooperate with the claims investigation process by refusing to answer a series of questions during one of his examinations.5 In light of these seemingly suspicious circumstances, counsel for the insurer argued that the insurer was not prepared to pay the value of the claim unless Mr. Demetriou was better able to substantiate the loss he had incurred.
Counsel for Mr. Demetriou argued that his client did satisfy his best efforts to prove his claim, citing his client's timely disclosure of the theft incident to several foreign and local authorities and undergoing several examinations under oath. Counsel for Mr. Demetriou further submitted that the defendant insurer was barred from alleging fraud at that stage of the proceeding, since the insurer's representative confirmed at discoveries that they would not be relying on allegations of fraud and did not provide any particulars of fraud in their pleadings.
In his decision, Justice Gray was satisfied that Mr. Demetriou had sufficiently cooperated with the insurer's investigation into the alleged theft of the ring. Justice Gray was also satisfied that Mr. Demetriou and his counsel had developed and implemented a litigation strategy informed in part by the understanding that the insurer would not be alleging or pursuing allegations of fraud.
Justice Gray prohibited the insurer from alleging fraud at that late stage of the proceeding. |
As a result, Justice Gray prohibited the insurer from alleging fraud at that late stage of the proceeding. Justice Gray proceeded to grant a summary judgement against the insurer without giving any consideration to suspicious circumstances as alleged by counsel for the insurer. The insurer was ultimately ordered to pay the value of the claim. Of note, Justice Gray awarded punitive damages as against the insurer for bad faith dealing, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.
Arguments & Analysis on Appeal
The Court of Appeal overturned the decision, ruling that Justice Gray ought to have allowed the insurer to amend its pleadings to include the denial of coverage on the basis of fraudulent behavior on the part of Mr. Demetriou.
The Court of Appeal relied on Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “...the Court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment”. The Court of Appeal opined that there was no such prejudice in the matter before them.
The Court of Appeal further stated that Justice Gray had erred prohibiting the insurer from amending their pleading and subsequently excluded from his consideration the evidence that raised the credibility issue with respect to the insured's claim. The Court of Appeal determined that the credibility of the insured's claim remained at issue and subsequently required a trial.
The Court of Appeal ordered a trial, permitting the insurer to amend its pleading to include allegations of fraud on the part of the insured. The punitive damages award against the insurer was also overturned.
Conclusion
By and large, the adjudication of civil claims by Ontario courts tend to proceed “without surprises”. For instance, as was the case on summary judgement, when fraudulent activity or circumstances are alleged, the litigation strategies and pleadings of all parties to the litigation ought to reflect that fact. The summary judgement provided that once a party expressly denies relying on an allegation of fraud, that that allegation would no longer be available to them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal interpreted the Rules broadly and granted leave to amend a pleading “at any stage of an action”, unless non-compensable prejudice would result. So, even if a party previously denies their reliance on allegations of fraud, that does not necessarily mean that such allegations are no longer available to them. As such, counsel should remain mindful of the future paths their matters may take and should opt to keep their litigation strategies flexible to account for such a change.
Read the full decision or read other Case Summaries for January:
- 2002 SCC 18.
- 016 ONSC 5584 at para 150.
- 2019 ONSC 627.
- See Hajgato v Gibraltar General Insurance Co (1984), 23 ACWS (2d) 557 and Shakur v Pilot Insurance Co (1990), 74 OR (2d) 673.
- Supra note 3 at para 42.